By Atty. Julius Gregory B. Delgado

THE DOCTRINE OF INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT

RE: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CHIRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING THE GRANT OF RETIREMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA AND HER CLAIM FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION AS HIS WIFE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946

First of a Two-Part Series

On 04 February 2021, the Supreme Court published a Decision dated 12 January 2021 in A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC entitled “Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Christina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and Other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and Her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife under Republic Act No. 9946”. In a unanimous vote, the Court granted the request of Mrs. Corona for the retirement benefits of his late husband, former Chief Justice Renato Corona, and her survivorship benefits. The Court favorably granted her requests because of the lacuna or absent of any law which extends the penalty of impeachment to forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Section 3 (7), Article VI of XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.” In granting the retirement benefits of the late Chief Justice who was convicted by the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment against him, the Court cited the treatise of Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas and held:

“Impeachment is, thus, designed to remove the impeachable officer from office, not punish him. It is purely political, and is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature. It is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature. No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.”

I agree with the Decision because the interpretation of the above-cited provision of the Constitution is that after conviction in the Impeachment Trial, he still needs to be prosecuted civilly, criminally and/or administratively to impose upon him other consequences in addition to perpetual disqualification to hold public office again which is necessarily included in an Impeachment conviction. A criminal case is needed to be instituted if the grounds upon which he was impeached is also a felony or crime. A civil case needs to be instituted in order to determine if the impeached officer should remunerate or return what he has received by virtue of the office of which he was impeached. An administrative case needs to be instituted in order to forfeit his retirement benefits. Upon the death of the late former Chief Justice, all the cases against him were all dismissed. 

What is peculiar though of this Decision is that it had to rely on equity in granting the prayer of Mrs. Corona and the need to come up with a doctrine of “involuntary retirement”. Normally, a retirement is involuntary since you reach a certain age wherein you are mandated to retire from public service. While there is a voluntary kind of retirement, i.e., when you avail of optional retirement before attaining mandatory retirement age, the Court has to coin the term “involuntary” as the late former Chief Justice was involuntary separated from his seat as Chief Justice of the Republic by virtue of his conviction in the Impeachment Court. The Court expounded on this point when it held:

“There is a sizeable vacuum in the law that blurred the circumstances of Chief Justice Corona’s impeachment pending the resolution of the other charges filed against him. Notably, from the time the impeachment court rendered its judgment, there has been no law that commands the automatic cancellation of post-employment benefits and other privileges pertaining to the impeached official. Chief Justice Corona’s untimely demise and the consequent termination of other charges against him all the more compound the issue. Considering the foregoing, we hold that Chief Justice Corona was involuntary retired by virtue of his conviction arising from impeachment. This is fortified by the failure of the other forum to follow through and conclude the proceedings before it that should have brought to fruition the full consequences of his removal from his post.”

Finally, the Court ratiocinated that issues on retirement benefits should be liberally construed in favor of the retiree. The Court held that retirement benefits “are not mere gratuity but a reward for allotting the best years of a public servant’s life in the service of the country.” The Court also held that “retirement benefits also form part of the emolument that serve the alternative purpose of encouraging and retaining qualified employees in the government service.” While I agree with the grant of retirement benefits to the late Chief Justice Corona and the survivorship of his wife, Ma. Christina, a serious ramification of this ruling and pressing question is if this applies also to the case of the former Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno who was removed by a Quo Warranto proceedings two years ago. We will discuss the same in the next part of this series.