“ARLENE PALGAN VS. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY, ET AL.”, G.R. No. 219916 (10 February 2021):
Paper Victory for the School but Enriches Philippine Jurisprudence
First of a Two-Part Series
The case stems from a complaint for Illegal Dismissal filed by petitioner Arlene Palgan (“Palgan”) against Holy Name University (“HNU”) alleging that she was a regular employee and that she was illegally dismissed without due process of law after the school did not renew her employment contract.
Petitioner Palgan started working as a Casual or Assistant Clinical Instructor for two (2) semesters for school year (S.Y.) 1992-1993 in HNU’s College of Nursing while awaiting the results of her Nursing Board Examination. In the second semester of S.Y. 1994-1995, she was hired as a full-time Clinical Instructor until S.Y. 1998-99 and was assigned at the Medical Ward. During the second semester of S.Y. 1998-1999, she was transferred to the Guidance Center as a Nursing Guidance Instructor handling guidance, education, and graduate school courses. At this time, she was elected as Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Bohol. Upon her reelection for the 2001-2004 term, she took a leave of absence from HNU.
Sometime in the year 2004, petitioner rejoined HNU and was given full-time load for S.Y. 2004-2005. For S.Y. 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, petitioner signed contracts for term/semestral employment. However, in a notice dated 28 February 2007, HNU informed Arlene that her contract of employment, which would have expired on 31 March 2007, will no longer be renewed.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of petitioner Palgan which was initially affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”). Upon motion for reconsideration, NLRC reversed its earlier ruling and found petitioner Palgan to have been illegally dismissed and directed HNU to immediately reinstate her and pay her backwages in the amount of Php1,572,031.62. HNU filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC, hence, the school filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the NLRC. Thus, petitioner Palgan challenged this ruling before the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Supreme Court, citing Lacuesta vs. Ateneo de Manila University, G.R. No. 152777 (09 December 2005), held that in determining whether a faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent status, it is the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code which would govern. The Supreme Court held that under the Manual, petitioner Palgan did not meet all the criteria to be considered as permanent employee of HNU, to wit: 1) the teacher serves full-time; 2) he/she must have rendered three (3) consecutive years of service; and 3) such service must have been satisfactory.
The Court ruled that while petitioner Palgan rendered three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service, she was, however, not a full-time teacher at the College of Nursing of HNU. The reason why petitioner Palgan will not qualify as a full-time teacher of HNU’s College of Nursing is that the Commission on Higher Education (“CHED”), through its Memorandum Order No. 30, Series of 2001, requires a College of Nursing Faculty to have at least three (3) years of clinical practice in the field of specialization. The Court noted that CHED Memorandum No. 14, Series of 2009, lowered this requirement from three (3) years to one (1) year. The Court also cited the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991 which also requires the same qualification for faculty members in Nursing schools.
The Supreme Court held that while there is no definition of “clinical practice” under the law, its ordinary meaning can be deduced by statutory construction. By using “clinical” as an adjective, it can be reasonably construed to have a meaning narrower in scope than general practice of nursing. The Court held that “clinical” as an adjective is defined in the ordinary sense as “relating to the examination and treatment of patients and their illnesses,” or “to be relating to the observation and treatment of actual patients as rather than theoretical or laboratory studies.”
The Supreme Court held that petitioner Palgan failed to allege and adduce evidence that she was performing clinical nursing duties even if she was assigned at the medical ward at some point:
“While we can presume the same to be purely academical from the nomenclature, it is entirely possible that petitioner was performing clinical duties concurrently with her teaching duties, especially since she was assigned at the medical ward. However, since she never alleged to be performing clinical duties such as treating actual patients or assisting doctors in such treatment, nor did she present any substantial evidence to prove such, we cannot assume that she indeed performed clinical duties during her stint as a clinical instructor. Thus, since petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence, much less clearly describe what kind of work she rendered as a clinical instructor, we cannot consider such work experience as ‘clinical practice’”
Would the result have been different if petitioner Palgan sufficiently alleged and described in her complaint her duties and functions when she was assigned at the Medical Ward from the second semester of S.Y. 1994-1995 until S.Y. 1998-1999? (To be continued in the next part)