Julius Gregory Delgad
“ARLENE PALGAN VS. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY, ET AL.”, G.R. No. 219916 (10 February 2021):
Paper Victory for the School but Enriches Philippine Jurisprudence
Second Part of a Two-Part Series
In the first part of the series, we discussed the Supreme Court’s ratio on why petitioner Palgan cannot be considered as permanent or regular to the position of a full-time Clinical Instructor of the College of Nursing. It is because relevant regulations require that for someone to be considered for a permanent or regular Clinical Instructor position in a nursing school, he or she should have at least one (1) year experience of clinical practice of nursing, a requirement which petitioner Palgan failed to allege and prove.
Parenthetically, the Supreme Court also held that there was no illegal dismissal to speak of since there was no dismissal occurred. The Court held that petitioner Palgan’s fixed-term contract merely expired. Citing Caparoso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155505 (15 February 2007), the Court held that the requirements for valid fixed-term employment was met, to wit: 1) the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any circumstances vitiating his/her consent; or 2) it satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter. The Court held:
“As applied in this case, the fixed term contracts presented as evidence would reveal that the parties intended that their employee-employer relationship would last only for a specific period. Considering petitioner’s part-time status, even if no written fixed-term contract was presented, judicial notice can be made upon the fact that teacher’s employment contracts are for a specific semester or term.
With respect to consent, the fixed-term contracts must be presumed to be knowingly and voluntarily entered into. It is a basic rule that ‘one who alleges defect or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue influence must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence such specific acts that vitiated party’s consent, otherwise, the latter’s presumed consent to the contract prevails.’ In this case, petitioner merely alleged that she was a regular employee and that her being a contractual employee was just a lame reason given by HNU to terminate her without due process. These self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations are not the clear and convincing evidence required to overturn the presumption mentioned earlier. Thus, the fixed-term contracts should be presumed as having been knowingly and voluntarily entered into by both parties.
For the second requisite of a valid fixed-term contract, petitioner was more or less on equal footing with HNU. Petitioner, by her own admission, was an honors graduate and has stellar qualifications. Moreover, she has also admitted she is an elected public official and appears to be quite popular, given that she has won as municipal councilor multiple times and even placed number one in terms of votes garnered. These facts would make apparent that petitioner is not a mere run-of-the mill employee, and that she certainly has the capability to be on equal footing in dealing with her employer when it came to her employment terms.”
If petitioner Palgan was able to allege and prove that she has had an experience of clinical nursing for one (1) year, would the decision of the Supreme Court be in her favor? There is a good chance that the Supreme Court decided in her favor because the first requisite for a valid fixed-term employment would be wanting. It is more likely that the Supreme Court would rule that it cannot be gainsaid that the parties, when they entered the employment contract, intended the employment to be fixed-term or would end on a day-certain because petitioner Palgan would then have an expectation to be a regular or permanent employee since she has the qualifications to be a permanent and regular full-time Clinical Instructor. In the instant case, the Supreme Court only ruled that the parties entered a fixed-term contract or with a limited period because there is just no way petitioner Palgan qualifies as permanent or regular employee for that position because of relevant Government regulations. In any event, the doubt created triggers the legal presumption in favor of labor.
In closing, as petitioner Palgan won at the NLRC level and victory thereof is immediately executory absent any temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, there is a big chance that HNU already paid her backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement if there was no actual reinstatement due to strained relations. If that is the case, this would appear to be a paper victory for HNU. Nonetheless, this is a moral victory for the school and this case enriches Philippine jurisprudence with respect to what constitutes clinical practice of nursing as a requirement to be a full-time Clinical Instructor in nursing schools.