Julius Gregory Delgado
VINCENTE J. CAMPA, JR., ET AL. VS. HON. EUGENE C. PARAS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. NO. 250504 (12 JULY 2021): RESTATEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON INORDINATE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
First of a Two-Part Series
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” This is separate and distinct from the right to a speedy trial of an accused under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The latter pertains to criminal proceedings before the trial court while the former may be invoked in all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies, in civil, criminal, or administrative cases. On 12 July 2021, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in G.R. No. 250504 entitled “Vicente J. Campa, Jr. and Perfecto M. Pascua vs. Hon. Eugene C. Paras, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 58, Makati City and People of the Philippines”.
Consistent with the right of a citizen to speedy disposition of cases, the Supreme Court has laid down the doctrine that inordinate delay in the resolution of cases warrant their dismissal. In the leading case of Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438 (31 July 2018) and other jurisprudence on the matter usually pertain to cases before the Office of the Ombudsman and/or Sandiganbayan involving public officials. But in the instant case, this pertains to preliminary investigation before the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) which took more than ten (10) years to resolve.
On 12 September 2007, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) filed a complaint before the DOJ against officers of BankWise, Inc., including petitioners Vicente J. Campa, Jr. and Perfecto M. Pascua, for violation of Monetary Board Resolution No. 1460 in relation to Section 3, Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act. Along with their co-respondents therein, petitioners Campa and Pascua were accused of issuing unfunded manager’s checks and failing to present documents to support the bank’s disbursements in acquiring assets. More than ten (10) years thereafter, under Resolution dated 08 February 2019, the DOJ found probable cause to hold them liable for the offense charged. Accordingly, the DOJ filed before the RTC, Makati City eleven (11) Informations against Campa and five (5) against Pascua. Petitioners Campa and Pascua filed a motion seeking the dismissal on the ground of inordinate delay in violation of their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The trial court denied their motion. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
In the Decision, the Supreme Court first resolved the issue whether petitioners Campa and Pascua violated the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts by directly going up to the Supreme Court instead of going to trial and later filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court held that petitioners’ direct recourse to it is covered among the exceptions, i.e., exigency in certain situations and petitioners had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as the only alternative to filing the petition was to proceed to trial and prolong further the disposition of cases. The Court held, “Indeed, it would be counterproductive, nay, illogical for petitioners to go through a full-blown trial and wait for an adverse ruling before they may be allowed to assert their right to speedy disposition of their cases.”
To aid the courts in determining whether there is inordinate delay in the resolution of a case, Philippine legal system has adopted the so-called Balancing Test first introduced in Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which laid down the four (4) criteria: first, the length of delay; second, the reason for delay; third, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his or her right; and fourth, the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay.
In Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, the Supreme Court further refined the guidelines insofar as preliminary investigations are concerned: first, inordinate delay as a ground to cause the dismissal of the case may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial; second, the analysis whether the delay is reasonable or not during preliminary investigation depends on whether it is with the Office of the Ombudsman or before the DOJ, since in the latter, as can be gleaned in the instant case, can easily be determined by the procedure under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and DOJ Manual of Prosecutors, whereas in the former, there is no written rule but the Ombudsman is enjoined to set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation with due regard to complexities and nuances of each case; third, the courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof, i.e., if the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked, whereas, if the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay; fourth, the determination of length of delay is never mechanical but must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised; and fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised with the respondent or accused, respectively, filing the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods, otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
In the third guide mentioned above, once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove the following: 1) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; 2) that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; 3) that no prejudice was suffered by the accused because of the delay. In the Decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court also provided an exception to the fourth guide mentioned above, the Supreme Court provided for two exceptions: 1) the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite lack of evidence, wherein if malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven will result to automatic dismissal of the case without need of further analysis of the delay; and 2) if the accused acquiesced to the delay which is tantamount to a waiver of his right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. (To be continued in the next part)