Julius Gregory Delgado
VICENTE J. CAMPA, JR., ET AL. VS. HON. EUGENE C. PARAS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. NO. 250504 (12 JULY 2021): RESTATEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON INORDINATE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Second of a Two-Part Series
In the first part of this series, we discussed the facts of the case entitled “Vicente J. Campa, Jr. and Perfecto M. Pascua vs. Hon. Eugene C. Paras, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 58, Makati City and People of the Philippines”, G.R. No. 250504, decided by the Supreme Court on 12 July 2021. The Supreme Court modified and improved the elements in determining whether there is inordinate delay as would cause the dismissal of the case due to violation of the Constitutional right of a citizen to speedy disposition of cases as enunciated in another recent case of Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438 (31 July 2018). In the instant case of Campa, et al. vs. Hon. Eugene C. Paras and People of the Philippines, supra, concerning alleged violation of violation of Monetary Board Resolution No. 1460 in relation to Section 3, Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, the Supreme Court applied the elements and caused the dismissal of all cases against the petitioners.
On the first test of length of delay, the Supreme Court discussed the procedure on preliminary investigation in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 58 (b) of the Manual of Prosecutors. Investigating officers and the prosecuting agency have a maximum of sixty (60) days from date of assignment to conclude preliminary investigations. In this case of Campa, et al. vs. Hon. Eugene C. Paras and People of the Philippines, supra, the Supreme Court held that it is undisputed that it took the DOJ about ten (10) years and five (5) months from the filing of the complaint on 12 September 2007 before it issued a Resolution dated 08 February 2019 finding probable cause to indict the petitioners. The Supreme Court cited the cases of Remulla vs. Sandiganbayan, 808 Phil. 739 (2017), wherein it took nine (9) years to file an Information, and Cotamco vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 243560-62 & 243261-63 (28 July 2020), wherein it took almost five (5) years to file an Information, as bases of their ruling with periods being much shorter than that of the instant case.
On the second test of reason for delay, the Supreme Court held that the DOJ has the burden of proving that the delay in the resolution of the petitioners’ cases was not unreasonable. The Supreme Court struck down the reasoning of the DOJ, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (“OSG”), that the delay can be attributed to the changes in leadership at the DOJ, complexity of the case, as well as the DOJ’s workload. In the Decision, the Supreme Court held:
“As petitioners have aptly noted, their cases was already submitted for resolution before the DOJ as early as August 29, 2008. Since then, the DOJ no longer conducted any further investigation nor collected additional evidence; the prosecution already had all pieces of evidence in its possession. Surely, the processing of these documents could not have taken ten (10) years to conclude. Conspicuously, the prosecution itself brought to fore that when the case got reassigned to Assistant State Prosecutor Vilma D. Lopez-Sarmiento on January 23, 2019, she concluded the investigation in less than a month and finalized the DOJ Resolution on February 8, 2019. If the investigation truly took less than a month for the resolution to be finalized, then the rest of the delay, about ten (10) years and four (4) months, was unaccounted for, unexplained, and certainly inordinate.
x x x x x x x x x
Here, petitioners neither caused nor contributed to the delay – no dilatory tactics were employed, nor deedless motions, filed. In fact, the delay appears to be imputable purely on the prosecution. Hence, institutional delay could not be validly raised and considered in favor of the prosecution. For in this context, there is no one else to blame but itself.”
On the third test on assertion of petitioners’ right, the Supreme Court disregarded the argument of the DOJ, through the OSG, that petitioners supposedly waived their right to speedy disposition of cases for purportedly failing to assert their right during the pendency of the DOJ’s ten (10)-year investigation. The Supreme Court, citing the case of Javier and Tumamao vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 237997 (10 June 2020), held that it is not the duty of the accused or respondent to follow-up but that of the prosecution. The Court also noted that when the petitioners received the Resolution of the DOJ finding probable cause against them, they immediately sought for the dismissal of the case and when the trial court denied their motions, filed a Petition for Certiorari dated 09 December 2019 before the Supreme Court.
Lastly, on the fourth test on the prejudice because of the delay, the Supreme Court, citing Magante vs. Sandiganbayan, 836 Phil. 1108 (2018), held that the prejudice from delay is most serious when the defendant is rendered unable to adequately prepare his case. The Court held:
“Here, petitioners were unduly prejudiced by the ten (10)-year delay because access to records and contact to witnesses could prove to be too difficult to effectively defend themselves in trial. More, they were never informed or updated of the status of the investigation, depriving them of any opportunity to adequately prepare for any impending trial, mentally, physically, and even financially – especially considering their advanced age. In fact, petitioners mentioned that the delay made them believe that the proceedings had been terminated due to the sheer length of time that they were left hanging. Verily, without having the opportunity to prepare, they were left fully vulnerable, with neither a shield nor a sword in hand to defend a blow and parry an attack.”
This case of Campa, et al. vs. Hon. Eugene C. Paras and People of the Philippines, supra, clearly sharpened the tests whether there is an inordinate delay as would be the basis for the invocation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. At the end of the day, it should never be based on the length of delay alone but other factors and circumstances, such as when it is even the respondent or accused who resorted to dilatory motions and tactics. It is also important to observe the prescribed period within which to conclude preliminary investigation. If cases which have been submitted for resolution and took years to resolve, then it will be susceptible to invocation of this doctrine of inordinate delay when these cases reach the trial courts due to possible prejudice because of inability to access records and locate witnesses for their defense. This is basically boils down to the Due Process Clause of our 1987 Philippine Constitution.