Atty. Gregorio B. Austral, CPA
Revisiting the Residence Requirement for Local Elective Positions
The Local Government Code requires that an elective local official must be a resident of the local government unit where he is running for public office for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election (Sec. 39, R.A. 7160). This residence requirement has been a nagging issue in several cases decided by the COMELEC and the Supreme Court because the concept of residence is not applied in its ordinary sense to mean actual or physical presence in a certain place.
In Rogelio Batin Caballero vs. COMELEC and Jonathan Enrique B. Nanud, Jr., G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, the Supreme Court had the occasion to revisit the concept of residence in election laws.
Rogelio Caballero and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Nanud filed a petition to deny due course to or cancellation of Caballero’s certificate of candidacy (COC). One of the allegations in the petition is that Caballero committed a material misrepresentation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.
Caballero argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Caballero claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Caballero avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents’ vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the law. Caballero insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
The Supreme Court dismissed Caballero’s petition.
The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter here he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in Caballero’s case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
Caballero’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
Records indeed showed that Caballero failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Caballero’s argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is not persuasive.