Atty. Julius Gregory Delgado

JESSICA MAITIM A.K.A. JEAN GARCIA VS. MARIA THERESA AGUILA, G.R. NO. 218344 (MARCH 21, 2022):RESTATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN VEHICULAR ACCIDENT CASES

On March 21, 2022, the Supreme Court issued a Decision of even date in G.R. No. 218344 entitled “Jessica Maitim a.k.a. Jean Garcia vs. Maria Theresa Aguila.” Actress Jean Garcia and Maria Theresa Aguila were residents and neighbors at Grand Pacific Manor Townhouse. Their respective townhouse units were just nine (9) meters apart separated only by a driveway jointly used by them.

On April 25, 2006, Garcia was on board her vehicle registered under her name driven by Restituto Santos, the driver of the actress for twelve (12) years. While they were driving the common driveway, Aguila’s six-year old daughter, Angela Aserehet Aguila, was sideswiped by Garcia’s vehicle and was dragged approximately three (3) meters resulting to her leg being fractured. She was brought to St. Luke’s Medical Center and was diagnosed to have suffered swelling, hematoma, multiple abrasions, and displaced, complete fracture on the right leg. She underwent operation at Asian Hospital and was in a wheelchair from April 25, 2006 to July 18, 2006.

Since the barangay conciliation failed, a tort case was filed by Aguila against Garcia before the Regional Trial Court which ruled in favor of the former. The trial court held that Garcia’s driver Santos was presumed to be negligent, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that Garcia was vicariously liable for failure to prove that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that Aguila did not commit any contributory negligence in allowing Angela to exit their door towards the garage since they were still within the premises of their residence, and not on the street where vehicles ordinarily drive by. 

Garcia elevated the case before the Supreme Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts restating the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Citing the case of Solidum vs. People, G.R. No. 192123 (March 10, 2014), the Supreme Court held:

“Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as ‘the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.’ The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that ‘where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.’ It is simply ‘a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.”

Citing UPCB General Insurance Co. v. Pascual Liner, Inc., G.R. No. 242328 (April 26, 2021), the Supreme Court reiterated the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be established, and once established through the admission of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitur already starts to apply. 

As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit by a moving vehicle owned by Garcia and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation Report dated April 25, 2006. The fact that Angela sustained injuries in her collision with Garcia’s vehicle is also not in question. Thus, since it is clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall apply. An inference of negligence on the part of Santos, the person who controls the instrumentality (vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of presenting proof to the contrary.

The Supreme Court, in ruling that Garcia and Santos failed to discharge the burden of proving the contrary in their rebuttal evidence, hence the presumption of negligence, held:

“Ordinarily, driving inside a relatively narrow driveway shared by two houses would not result to children being hit and their bones fractured. This is because a reasonably prudent man, especially an alleged experienced driver, would have foreseen that the residents of the houses may exit towards the common driveway anytime, including young and playful children who may suddenly run across or along said driveway. Thus, a reasonably prudent man is expected to drive with utmost caution when traversing the said driveway, even if given a ‘clear’ signal by a guard. 

In fact, Maitim herself admits that there is a natural tendency to drive at a slow speed when in a narrow driveway. However, her allegation that Santos was driving at a slow speed, which is admittedly ‘natural,’ contradicts the circumstances surrounding Angela’s injury. If Santos truly drove slowly and with care, he should have been able to have ample opportunity to brake or otherwise steer the vehicle out of trouble, both of which did not happen in this case. 

Moreover, even if a running child were to get hit by a slow-moving vehicle, it is highly unlikely that the same would result to injuries so severe that it required surgery and afterwards being confined to a wheelchair for more than two months.

In sum, there is nothing natural about a child getting dragged for three meters and her leg being completely fractured by a slow-moving vehicle, especially if a reasonably prudent man was driving the vehicle with care. Thus, both the RTC and CA were right in finding negligence on the part of Santos.”

Penultimately, the Supreme Court also applied Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that “when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after section or both.” The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of the employee. In this case, the Court held that the finding of negligence on the part of the driver Santos gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of actress Jean Garcia as it was incumbent upon her to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her driver Santos.

Finally, the Supreme Court held that there is no contributory negligence on the part of Aguila as the driveway was a common area to both parties and Angela was not even running or loitering around but was actually on her way to board their car. There is no contributory negligence on the part of the mother in allowing her daughter to exit their door and walk towards their garage. The Court ended stating that there is reasonable expectation of safety, considering that the driveway is still within the premises of their residence and not on the street where vehicles ordinarily drive by.