Atty. Julius Gregory Delgado
MARIA VICIA CARULO-PADUA VS. JOSELITO PADUA: G.R. NO. 208258 (APRIL 27, 2022)
SEXUAL INCOMPATIBILITY DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY EQUATE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS A GROUND FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Petitioner Maria and respondent Joselito were married in a civil wedding on February 5, 1982 followed by a church wedding on December 18, 1982. Their marriage produced a son who was born on March 23, 1986. On July 17, 1997, petitioner Maria filed a Petition for Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code alleging psychological incapacity on the part of respondent Joselito because of sexual infidelity/perversion, attempt against her life and abandonment/lack of support. In a Decision dated September 2, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253 denied the petition ruling that petitioner Maria failed to overcome the presumption of the legal validity of their marriage. In a Decision dated August 28, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court stating that the circumstances alleged by petitioner Maria are grounds for Legal Separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. In restating the case of Tan-Andal vs. Andal, G.R. No. 196359 (May 11, 2021), the Supreme Court held that the following parameters must be used to determine what constitutes psychological incapacity: 1) the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; 2) caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed prior to their marriage; 3) caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and 4) proven by clear and convincing evidence. In Tan-Andal vs. Andal, supra, the Supreme Court also held that psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. The Court held that there must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Finally, in Tan-Andal vs. Andal, supra, the Supreme Court held that proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert but may be through ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage and will testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed form the supposedly incapacitated spouses.
Applying the totality of evidence test in determining psychological incapacity as laid down in Tan-Andal vs. Andal, supra, the Supreme Court held that while petitioner Maria presented a Personality Evaluation Report alleging that respondent Joselito’s personality disorder may have been caused by the contrasting parenting behavior of Joselito’s father and mother, the former failed to present any evidence or testimony on how Joselito reacted towards the supposed contrasting personalities of his parents during his formative years. The Court also held that there was also no account of how the said contrasting parenting behavior affected Joselito’s social, intellectual, moral and emotional growth. Following Tan-Andal vs. Andal, supra, the Court held that not only there was no interview or psychological test conducted upon Joselito, there was nobody who testified on vital information regarding his personality structure, upbringing and childhood such as members of his family, relatives, friends, and co-workers.
Also, citing Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042 (June 30, 2008), the Supreme Court held that sexual incompatibility or failure to satisfy the sexual needs of the partner, i.e., petitioner Maria wants the conventional way of coitus while respondent wants anal/oral sex, does not automatically equate to psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code:
Anent Dr. Villegas’ statement that Joselito’s preference for oral and anal sex is a grave and serious personality disorder because it affects the sexual function of Joselito and the sexual life of Maria. We hereby reiterate our pronouncement in Molina that “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, it was ruled that the failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons does not amount to psychological incapacity. In this case, the couple’s irreconcilable sexual preferences would in no way amount to psychological incapacity. Joselito’s inability to sexually satisfy his wife Maria because the latter prefers the conventional way of coitus could not be taken to mean that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated. Sexual incompatibility is not a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Finally, with regard to the other grounds relied by petitioner Maria, i.e., sexual infidelity and abandonment, the Court held that it agrees with the Court of Appeals that said circumstances, assuming that they were true, are grounds for Legal Separation under Article 55 of the Family Code and not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.