Atty. Julius Gregory Delgado
SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN VS. ROMEO URRUTIA, G.R. NO. 223595 (MARCH 16, 2022):
POWER OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO DISCIPLINE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE SANGGUNIAN
This case stems from a complaint of Ms. Elizabeth B. Laron (“Laron”), an on-the-job trainee/student working in the City Government of Valenzuela Employees Cooperative (“Cooperative”) against respondent Romeo Urrutia (“respondent Urrutia”), Records Officer IV of the Council Secretariat, Sangguniang Panlungsod of Valenzuela City, and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative. Then City Mayor of Valenzuela City, petitioner Sherwin T. Gatchalian (“petitioner Gatchalian”) constituted the Personnel Complaints and Ethics Board (“PCEB”) as the Committee on Decorum and Investigation (“CODI”), which was divided into CODI-Preliminary Investigation (“CODI-I”) and CODI- Formal Hearing (“CODI-II”).
On March 23, 2012, both a formal charge for Sexual Harassment (Grave Offense) and order of preventive suspension in Administrative Case No. CODI-201201 was issued by petitioner Gatchalian. Respondent Urrutia was given a period of 72 hours within which to file his answer under oath with his witnesses’ affidavits, other documentary evidence, with a statement whether he elects to have a formal investigation or waives the same. Respondent Urrutia was likewise suspended for 60 days. On March 26, 2012, respondent Urrutia filed with the CODI an urgent omnibus motion (a) for reconsideration; (b) to recall the order of preventive suspension; and (c) to dissolve formal charge, in lieu of answer under oath and other supplemental affidavits and documents. Respondent Urrutia questioned the creation of the new CODI and alleged that since only the Vice-Mayor, not the Mayor, has the sole power to appoint officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, thus, the Vice Mayor has supposedly the sole power of removal under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. The CODI denied the omnibus motion filed by respondent Urrutia. Thereupon, a formal investigation ensured and several oral and written motions filed by respondent Urrutia to hold in abeyance the proceedings were all denied.
On May 17, 2012, while the administrative case was pending with the CODI, respondent Urrutia filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the Civil Service Commission (“CSC”) from the order of preventive suspension of petitioner Gatchalian and questioning the creation and jurisdiction of the CODI. On July 4, 2012, the CODI issued Resolution No. 2012-008 finding respondent Urrutia liable for Sexual Harassment, which is classified as a Grave Offense under the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases and recommended his dismissal from service. On August 15, 2012, the CODI issue an Order denying respondent Urrutia’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed Resolution No. 2012-008.
On July 26, 2012, the CSC promulgated a Decision granting the appeal of respondent Urrutia and finding the formal charge and order of preventive suspension by then Mayor Gatchalian as null and void. On a Petition for Review, the Court of Appeals denied and affirmed the ruling of the CSC favoring respondent Urrutia. Hence, then Mayor Gatchalian filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Respondent Urrutia invokes the so-called “Doctrine of Implication” in relation to Section 456 (a) (2) of the Local Government Code, wherein the the Vice Mayor’s power to appoint officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlungsod supposedly carries with it the power to discipline the same officials and employees, absent any contrary statutory provision.
“(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code;”
The Supreme Court granted petitioner Gatchalian’s petition and reversed and set aside the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the CSC. First, the Court notes that when Urrutia committed the Sexual Harassment acts against Laron, he was concurrently acting as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the City Employees Cooperative where Laron was an on-the-job trainee/student, and as a staff of the Council Secretariat of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which is the position contemplated by Article 456(a)(2) of the Local Government Code. The Court held that these two positions, Chairman of the City Employees Cooperative and staff of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, are separate and distinct from each other.
Second, the Court held that there is an exception to this Doctrine of Implication expressed in the phrase “absent any contrary statutory provision”. Ergo, the power to appoint does not give the power to remove when it is expressly vested to someone else or to a particular tribunal by law. The exception is present and applicable in the case at bar since there is a specific provision in Section 8 (b) (1) (jj) of Republic Act No. 8526, otherwise known as the City Charter of Valenzuela City, which provides that the City Mayor has the duty to ensure that the City’s executive officials and employees faithfully discharge their duties and functions, and cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any city official or employee who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties. This provision was lifted from Section 455 (b) (I) (x) of the Local Government Code. Hence, in this case, petitioner Gatchalian, as then City Mayor of Valenzuela City, had the express power to discipline respondent Urrutia, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative.
It is worth noting that what was elevated to the CSC by respondent Urrutia was only the order of petitioner Gatchalian placing him under preventive suspension and the question on the creation and jurisdiction of the CODI. The CSC already issued a ruling on the Memorandum of Appeal filed by respondent Urrutia before the CODI eventually issued Resolution No. 2012-008 dismissing the latter. Hence, this author opines that the case did not resolve with finality the merits of the case of respondent Urrutia. The instant case is bereft of any information if respondent Urrutia eventually questioned his dismissal from service.