By Atty. Julius Gregory B. Delgado
DANICA L. MEDINA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 255632 (JULY 25, 2023):
A SUM OF MONEY RECEIVED BY AN EMPLOYEE ON BEHALF OF THE EMPLOYER IS NOT IN THE JURIDICAL POSSESSION OF THE EMPLOYEE BUT ONLY IN THE EMPLOYEE’S MATERIAL POSSESSION, HENCE, THE EMPLOYEE CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF ESTAFA BY MISAPPROPRIATIOIN
Petitioner Danica L. Medina was a Regional Office Staff of the Philippine Public Schools Teachers Association (“PPSTA”) of the PPSTA Cordillera Administrative Region assigned in collecting remittances from teachers-members. Between the period of September 2011 to March 2012, she supposedly collected remittances, accepted premium and membership payments from teachers-members in the amount of Php88,452.00 but did not deposit/remit the same and supposedly misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to her personal use to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties. Apart from the PPSTA Internal Auditor, two teachers-members testified against petitioner Medina stating that they remitted payments but were not credited in their respective accounts.
The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner Medina of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional as minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal. The trial court held that failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner Medina’s conviction but modified the penalty.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside petitioner Medina’s conviction. The Court held that the RTC and the CA were both mistaken in declaring that petitioner Medina had juridical possession of the payments she collected from the PPSTA members. Juridical possession is possession which gives the transferee a right over the property received, which the transferee may set up even against the owner. Sum of money received by an employee on behalf of the employer is not in the juridical possession of the employee; it is only in the employee’s material possession.
The Supreme Court held that, “The prosecution alleged that petitioner Medina was responsible for collecting remittances from the Department of Education and accepting premium payments from PPSTA members; and depositing these payments in PPSTA’s bank account, as instruction by the PPSTA Treasurer. The record is bereft of any allegation or proof that petitioner Medina had any independent right or title to these funds that she could set up against PPSTA. Contrary to the findings of the CA, petitioner Medina was not a ‘trustee’ of the PPSTA members’ payments, as she received these sums as employee of, and on behalf of, her employer. Consequently, petitioner Medina only had material and not juridical possession of these funds, and she cannot be convicted of estafa under Article 315 (b) (1), RPC.”
The Supreme Court then discussed if petitioner Medina can be held liable for Theft, either Simple or Qualified. The Court held that petitioner Medina cannot be convicted of Theft because the element of taking was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the CA’s reliance of the acknowledgment receipts allegedly issued by petitioner Medina to the PPSTA members is misplaced and cannot be the basis to prove unlawful taking. The Court held that the Internal Auditor admitted that he had no personal knowledge that it was petitioner Medina who received the members’ contributions and that his basis for claiming that she did in fact receive these contributions were the acknowledgment receipts she issued. The Court held that it must be emphasized that these acknowledgment receipts are private documents, hence, under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution must be proved either (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
The Supreme Court held that, “while Monforte enumerated the various acknowledgment receipts, payment slips, and statements of account allegedly issued by petitioner Medina in his direct testimony, he did not authenticate them. He did not claim to have seen the execution of the receipts, nor did he explain why or how he became familiar with petitioner Medina’s signature. Only the Statement of Account signed by petitioner medina and authenticated by Tamondong, indicating the former’s receipt of PHp1,938.00 from Tamondong and the UCPB Payment Slip also signed by petitioner Medina and authenticated by Dumbab, indicating the former’s receipt of Php2,040.00 from Dumbab, were properly admitted into evidence by RTC.”