By Atty. Julius Gregory B. Delgado

PEOPLE VS. ADRIAN ADRALES, G.R. NO. 242473 (MAY 22, 2024): RESTATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEXUAL ABUSE SHIELD RULE MAKING INADMISSIBLE VICTIM’S PAST SEXUAL ACTS IN CHILD ABUSE CASES

Petitioner Adrian Adrales was convicted by the trial court of three (3) counts of qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. The prosecution alleged that on separate occasions, Adrales acted as the intermediary or “pimp” of victim AAA to three persons named “Emong”, “Sir” and “Hernan” and paying the victim each time the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (Php800.00). For his defense, Adrales vehemently denied the charges and claimed that it was AAA who knew Emong, Sir and Hernan. AAA also added that he only realized that AAA was engaged in prostitution after hanging with her almost every night. Adrales asserted that he had nothing to do with it since AAA was already well-know in their place as a woman of ill-repute, or a “pokpok” or “pila-balde”. Adrales also added that he already disassociated himself with AAA when rumors began to spread that he was the latter’s pimp. Finally, he had a supposed agreement with AAA’s sister during a barangay confrontation that he would no longer communicate with AAA in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint for trafficking filed against him by AAA and her sister. 

The trial court, in convicting Adrales, held that the evidence clearly showed that Adrales took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as she was just 14 years old at the time when the offenses were committed. According to the trial court, the best evidence against Adrales was his own admission that he escorted AAA to, and was present in, all the places where AAA was sexually exploited by Emong, Sir, and Hernan, even to the extent that he waited for the consummation of the sexual acts and had to leave together with AAA each time. The trial court also found that this circumstance gave credence to AAA’s testimony that Adrales acted as her manager and had to wait for his share in the payment for the sexual services offered by AAA. Additionally, it rejected as immaterial and irrelevant Adrales’ defense that AAA is a well-known prostitute, citing in this regard the “sexual shield rule”. Finally, the trial court held that Adrales’ general denial is self-serving without independent supporting evidence or credible corroborating testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 

The Supreme Court held that Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term “Trafficking in Persons” as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at the minimum, the exploitation or prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.” The same provision further provides that “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child support for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as “trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”

The elements of “Trafficking in Persons”within the context of Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 are as follows: (a) the act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders”; (b) the means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another”; and (c) the purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes “exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.” Additionally, Section 6 (a) of RA 9208 explicitly provides that “Trafficking in Persons” shall be in qualified form “when trafficked persons is a child.”

In affirming the ruling of the trial court and the appellate court, the Supreme Court agrees that all elements of the offense were established. The Court held that the testimony of AAA was direct, straightforward, and consistent. She clearly narrated that Adrales befriended her, and from there recruited her, frequently contacted her through text messages, and transported her to places where she was to engage in sexual activities. This was not just with one man, but with two other men, and multiple times at that. In all these instances Adrales, as observed by both courts a quo, was with AAA before, during, and after her sexual encounters. AAA was also forthright that both she and Adrales were paid for her sexual “services”. The Court affirmed the finding that Adrales took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability and would have continued to do so had Hernan’s wife not discovered the infidelity of her husband which led to a confrontation with AAA and, in turn, led to AAA relating the incidents to her family and AAA and her sister filing a complaint. AAA’s minority was proven by the presentation of her Birth Certificate.

On the defense of Adrales that AAA is known as “pokpok” or “pila-balde”, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine of Sexual Abuse Shield Rule under Section 30 (a) (1) and (2) of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (RECW), which provides that evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior, or offered to prove the secual predisposition of the alleged victim, is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual abuse. The said rule is a variation of the Rape Shield Rule under Section 6 of RA 8505 or the Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act which provides that “in prosecution for rape, evidence of complainant’s past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or his/her reputation shall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds, that such evidence is material and relevant to the case.” Both these rules, and particularly Section 30 of the RECW, morror Rule 412 (a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the United States of America.

The Supreme Court explained the rational of the shield, to wit: “As explianed in the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence clarifying the 1994 amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States, the rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarassment, and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process. Further, the protection afforded by the rule likewise encourages alleged victims of sexual misconduct to institute, and to participate in, legal proceedings against alleged offenders, as it bars evidence relating to their sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition, whether offered as substantive evidence or for impeachment.” The Court also held that “the adoption of the sexual abuse shield rule in cases such as the one at bar is significant because our Rules on Evidence allow previous conduct as evidence under Rule 130, Section 34, as well as character evidence under Rule 130, Section 54 – both which could be used against children or minors to deleterious effect, given that fear of court process, fear of exposure or labeling, and feart that they will not be believed are major deterrents to children from seeking legel intervention.” The Supreme Court concluded that “espousal of the rule is likewise consistent with the bets interets of the child, which is paramount cojnsideration in matters involving minors.”

Finally, the Supreme Court held that even assuming arguendo that this Court allows admission of the said testimony against AAA’s credibility and accepts it as a fact, the Court held it will not overturn the conviction because AAA being a prostitute is immaterial, irrelevant, and has nothing to dow ith the offense committed by Adrales and is not per se determinative of whether he engaged in the acts deemed punishable by law. The Court held that “Trafficking in Persons” can still be committed even though the minor or the victim knew or consented to the act of trafficking as Section 3 (a), the crime can exist even with the victim’s consent or knowledge.