BY ATTY. JULIUS GREGORY B. DELGADO
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. CITY OF MALABON, ET AL., G.R. NO. 269159 (NOVEMBER 4, 2024): PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IMPROPER AND PREMATURE REMEDY TO SETTLE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IF PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OUTLINED UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH
The case stems from a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City assailing Republic Act No. 9019 enacted on March 5, 2001, which converts the Municipality of Malabon into a highly urbanized city (HUC). The said law was ratified by the electorate of the Municipality of Malabon in a plebiscite conducted on April 21, 2001. Petitioners Punong Barangays of Barangays 160 and 161 in Libis, Baesa, Caloocan City, later joined by the City of Caloocan, questioned the supposed inclusion of some portions of these barangays within the definition of the territory of City of Malabon. Petitioners argued that no plebiscite for the constituents of these barangays was conducted in violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Respondent Malabon raised technicality stating that a Petition for Declaratory Relief is an improper remedy since resolving territorial boundary disputes between local government units is outlined in Sections 118 and 119 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC).
After trial, RTC Caloocan City issued a ruling in favor of the City of Caloocan nullifying and rendering as unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9019. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling. Hence, the City of Caloocan filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that there is a territorial boundary dispute since Caloocan argues that Section 2 of RA 9019 included substantial portions of its territories which the city has been exercising jurisdiction, historically, legally, politically, and administratively, without plebiscite. On the other hand, Malabon argues that the “specific area or territory in question alleged to have been lost by Barangays 160 and 161 and by the City of Caloocan, as a result of Section 2 of RA 9019, was never part of the territorial jurisdiction of Caloocan City, as shown and established by the technical description of Caloocan City itself….” The Court held, “Rule III, Article 15 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC provides that a boundary disputes (sic) involving different local government units exists when ‘a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs.”
The Supreme Court held that “following Section 118 (d) of the LGC, the boundary dispute involving these two cities should have been jointly referred to their respective Sanggunians for amicable settlement. It is only when the amicable settlement procedure fails that the parties can elevate the matter to the RTC pursuant to Section 119 of the same Code. Consequently, the direct resort to the RTC in this case was improper and premature warranting the outright dismissal of the petition for declaratory relief filed before the court a quo.”
The Court expounded that the Sanggunians, in resolving boundary disputes, must comply with boundary lines between competing LGUs, as specified by the natural boundaries or by metes and bounds in accordance with the laws creating them as these reflect the will of Congress vis-à-vis the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. Parenthetically, should it reach the courts, the Supreme Court held that an appeal by either party must likewise be limited to the factual determination of the boundary lines between these LGUs as specified in the laws respectively creating them.
Finally, the Supreme Court, in ruling the impropriety of a Petition for Declaratory Relief, held that such is available only prior to the breach or violation of a statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers, and there be no other adequate relief available to petitioners. Hence, if adequate relief is available through another form of action or proceeding, the other action should be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.
The Court held, “Under the LGC, boundary disputes between and among LGUs must first be referred jointly for amicable settlement to the Sanggunians of the concerned LGUs, pursuant to Section 118 of the LGC, and it is only upon failure of these intermediary steps will resort to the RTC follow, as specifically provided in Section 119 of the LGC. Thus, as correctly noted by the CA, Caloocan should have first complied with the amicable settlement procedure under Section 118 of the LGC. This is the appropriate and adequate remedy provided under the law for resolving boundary disputes between LGUs. It is only after the same should have failed that recourse to the RTC may be taken. Consequently, for failing to undertake the intermediary step, the petition for declaratory relief before the RTC was premature. As such, the issue was not yet ripe for judicial determination.”