By: Atty. Gregorio B. Austral, CPA
Presidential Ad-Hoc Committees: Investigating the Investigators
In the Philippines, the creation of ad-hoc committees and investigative bodies by the President through Executive Orders (E.O.s) has long been a tool for addressing urgent national concerns—be it corruption, economic disputes, or governance crises. But while these bodies often promise swift action and accountability, they also raise complex legal and constitutional questions.
The President’s power to create ad-hoc committees is rooted in the executive’s constitutional mandate to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. This authority is codified in Section 49, Chapter 10, Book I of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which expressly allows the President and other executive officials to hold positions in ad hoc bodies or committees, in addition to their primary positions. This provision recognizes the necessity and flexibility of forming such bodies to address specific issues as they arise.
Historically, Presidents have exercised this power to create fact-finding boards and committees for high-profile investigations. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1886 (October 14, 1983) established an independent ad hoc fact-finding board with plenary powers to investigate the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. The decree emphasized the need for a free, independent, and dispassionate investigation to ventilate the truth and restore public trust.
However, the creation of these bodies is not without controversy. One major issue is the potential overlap with constitutionally created offices, such as the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice. The Supreme Court has clarified that fact-finding bodies do not supplant the jurisdiction of these offices, but merely assist in gathering facts. In several cases involving the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, the Court recognized the committee’s role in investigating and recommending actions, but ultimately affirmed that the Ombudsman retains the power to determine whether to prosecute (see Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135482, August 14, 2001; see also Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15, 2009).
Another contentious point is the principle of equal protection. The Supreme Court has previously struck down the creation of certain ad-hoc bodies when their mandates were found to be arbitrary or discriminatory, such as when a fact-finding commission was tasked to investigate only a particular administration, thereby violating the equal protection clause.
Moreover, the proliferation of ad-hoc committees can sometimes lead to confusion, bureaucratic overlap, and questions about transparency and accountability. As seen in the investigation of so-called “behest loans,” ad-hoc committees have played a role in uncovering irregularities, but their findings must ultimately be evaluated by regular prosecutorial bodies. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Ombudsman’s decisions, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be overturned, and that the committee’s findings are recommendatory (see Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145184, March 14, 2008; see also PCGG v. Desierto, G.R. No. 139296, November 23, 2007).
Ad-hoc committees, when properly constituted and limited in scope, can serve as valuable instruments for good governance. Yet, their creation must always respect constitutional boundaries, avoid arbitrary classifications, and ensure that due process is observed. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the President’s power to investigate is broad but not unlimited.
In the end, the challenge lies in striking a balance: empowering the executive to act decisively in the public interest, while safeguarding the rule of law and the rights of all citizens.