BY ATTY. JULIUS GREGORY B. DELGADO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TERESITA J. SOLIVA, G.R. NO. 268309 (AUGUST 6, 2025): SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS CONVICTION OF A MUNICIPAL MAYOR WHO FAILED TO LIQUIDATE INTELLIGENCE AND CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS, TRAVEL, AND PEACE AND ORDER EXPENSES
Accused-appellant Teresita J. Soliva (“Accused-Appellant”) was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for one (1) count of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 and ten (10) counts of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Account under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code for her unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php886,666.58 when she was still the Municipal Mayor of Doňa Remedios T. Romualdez (“RTR”), Agusan del Norte from 2001 to 2007.
The Sandiganbayan rendered Accused-Appellant to have waived her right to present evidence for her repeated failure to appear despite notice. In her desire to overturn her conviction, she successfully availed of post-judgment remedies under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court when she filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies with Reconsideration. After comment by the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan found no sufficient basis to reverse its earlier judgment of conviction, hence, the appeal by the Accused-Appellant before the Supreme Court.
On the procedural aspect, the Supreme Court resolved the issue whether the Certification from the Municipal Accountant of RTR, Agusan del Norte that Accused-Appellant already made payments for her cash advances through her terminal leave credits may be considered as newly discovered evidence warranting new trial. The Supreme Court laid down the following requisites to grant new trial: (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
The Supreme Court held that these requisites are not present in the instant case. For the first and second requisites, the Certification that Accused-Appellant was able to pay a portion of her outstanding balance could have been secured at an earlier date and made available during trial. Accused-Appellant previously pleaded several times to submit such certification but to no avail. Accused-Appellant also did not exert diligent efforts to obtain such certification as evidenced by her repeated absences in the set hearings and her failure to present any form of evidence in her defense. As to the third and fourth requisites, assuming that the certification has weight and probative value, it is only evidence of Soliva’s partial payment of the amount she failed to account for and liquidate. While it may show payment for her civil liability, it is not material in the sense that it could not exonerate her form the criminal aspect thereof.
On the substantive aspect, Accused-Appellant argues that she could not be held liable under Article 218 since such crime is considered as mala in se and criminal intent must be established. Accused-Appellant claims that she had no criminal intent not to liquidate the cash advances, hence, could not be held liable under such provision. In rejecting Accused-Appellant’s argument, the Supreme Court held that not all crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code are mala in se and not all crimes punished under special penal laws are mala prohibita. The crime of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code is in the nature of mala prohibitum. The failure to liquidate in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit is not inherently immoral or wrong in itself, however, by reason of public policy, particularly the need for public funds to be duly accounted for, the failure to render accounts within the prescribed periods is penalized by law.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Accused-Appellant for ten (10) counts of violation of Article 218 (Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Account) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court held that despite receiving cash advances for intelligence and confidential funds, travel, and peace and order expenses, Accused-Appellant failed to liquidate these cash advances. Accused-Appellant disregarded demand letters sent to her and failed to provide a justifiable cause for her failure to render accounts.
The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction of Accused-Appellant for one (1) count of Article 217 (Malversation of Public Funds) of the Revised Penal Code finding all elements, i.e., (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is accountable; and (4) the offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property, present in the instant case. The Court restated an established doctrine that municipal mayors are accountable officers by the nature of their of their functions, or on account of their participation the use or application of public funds. Accused-Appellant had control and responsibility over public funds being the recipient of the cash advances utilized by her office. The first three (3) elements of Malversation of Public Funds were adequately established.
On the fourth and important element, the Supreme Court held that there is a presumption that the public officer has placed missing public funds for personal use if he or she cannot produce the funds upon demand of any duly authorized officer. While demand is not an element, once it is made, such presumption arises. In the instant case, Accused-Appellant failed to overthrow the presumption. Accused-Appellant’s failure to return the subject cash advances upon demand created the presumption that she used the funds for her personal use. She also offered no explanation for her inability to account for the unliquidated cash advances. Partial restitution cannot be used as defense as even if she did pay later portion of the outstanding balance, the crime has already been consummated when she failed to account for the missing funds after demands were made on her. The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the accused criminal’s liability.