BY ATTY. JULIUS GREGORY B. DELGADO
JUANITO B. SOTO VS. CASSANDRA REYES-SOTO, G.R. NO. 249759 (APRIL 22, 2026): RESTATEMENT OF TAN-ANDAL, GEORFO AND ESTELLA DOCTRINES ON NULLITY OF MARRIAGE DUE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE – PART I
Petitioner Juanito Soto and respondent Cassandra Reyes-Soto became friends in 1979 while studying at the University of the Philippines. After graduation, they became closer after they went to training at International Business Machines Corporation. They were eventually hired by the Bank of Philippine Islands. In 1981, they became couple and got married around September 1983 when respondent learned that she was pregnant. Respondent alleged that petitioner noticed little concern of the petitioner for her pregnancy. Petitioner did not accompany her to regular prenatal checkups and had to ask her friends to go with her instead. She began to harbor reservations about their relationship, sensing lack of affection from petitioner who was emotionally never expressive.
After the wedding, the couple lived with petitioner’s parents in Antipolo, Rizal. Respondent gave birth to their only child, Carmela. The birth of Carmela introduced challenges to their married life as the mother of petitioner interfered and meddled with their family decisions and concerns. When respondent asked petitioner to call out the attention of his mother, the latter exerted no decisive effort to assert their independence and continued to defer to his mother, on whom he appeared emotionally dependent. Tension intensified when petitioner’s mother disciplined Carmela by spanking her whenever the child misbehaved.
Aside from her mother-in-law’s meddling on their family affairs, respondent described their life together as monotonous and routinary. They would go to work, return home to sleep, and repeat the same cycle the following day. They rarely engaged in family activities and did not share a warm or affectionate relationship. Petitioner did not show her affection and they had not engaged in any intimate relations since 1986.
The same happened in 1988 when petitioner sought employment opportunities in the United States. Petitioner and respondent agreed that the latter and Carmela would join him once the former secured a stable work. Initially, respondent agreed. Respondent’s career prospered in the Philippines and she later relayed to the petitioner that she and Carmela would no longer migrate to the United States to live with him. Respondent and Carmela, however, exerted efforts to visit the petitioner but the latter did not make any effort to reconcile or rekindle their relationship. Just like in the Philippines, their life together in the United States was routinary and they did not have any family bonding moments.
Respondent moved out of the residence of petitioner’s parents and the petitioner did not even make an effort to convince her to reconsider. Even after being prodded by their respective parents for respondent and Carmela to visit petitioner in the United States, however, the petitioner showed little enthusiasm during their visits. From 1989, petitioner only sent approximately USD200 to USD 300 to respondent for Carmela’s educational expenses while respondent covered her other needs. Petitioner did not maintain any stable and consistent communication with her and their daughter.
In 1984, petitioner filed for divorce in the United States admitting later that he did it out of frustration and believing in would prompt respondent to reconcile. Respondent remained resolute and the divorce was eventually granted. In 2013, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court in denying the petition for review on certiorari of the petitioner restated the doctrines in Tan Andal vs. Andal, 902 Phil. 558 (2021), and Georfo vs. Republic of the Philippines, 937 Phil. 518 (2023), which established and recalibrated the requisites to declare marriage void based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. First, the incapacity must be marked by juridical antecedence, in that it existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if it manifested only after. Second, it must be incurable in a legal, not medical, sense, referring to a condition so enduring and persistent, particularly in relation to the specific spouse, that the marriage is rendered beyond repair. Third, the incapacity must be of such gravity that it arises from a genuinely psychic cause, a standard that does not require medical severity but excludes situations where the failure of the marriage is attributable merely to refusal, neglect, or ordinary difficulty in making the marital relationship work.
The Supreme Court also cited the case of Estella vs. Perez, 911 Phil. 570 (2021) on what types of evidence may be presented to prove psychological incapacity: “Indeed, lay persons can testify about dysfunctional acts that undermine the family. The types of evidence that a lay person may adduce for this purpose are: (i) the reputation of the incapacitated spoused being psychologically incapacitated – that is, the viewpoint of reasonable members of the spouses’ relevant communities; (ii) the character of the incapacitated spouse relevant or indicative of such incapacity; (iii) the everyday behavior, acts or conduct of the incapacitated spouse; and (iv) offended spouse’s own experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and infliction of mental distress, among others.
These types of evidence may establish circumstances probative of the dysfunctional acts inimical to the family. The relevant circumstances would include (i) instances of violence against women and their children as defined in Republic Act No. 9262, (ii) zero probability of reconciliation between spouses, and (iii) failure of the spouse or the spouses to perform his, her, or their marital duties and obligations that is clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
x x x Since Tan-Andal has abandoned the focus on personality disorders and expert opinions, this characterization may now be appropriated to capture the essence of the problematic personality structure or psychic causes that spawn psychological incapacity. Embraced in this inclusive circumstance are such facts as (i) forms of addiction demonstrative of such insensitivity or inability, (ii) abandonment by one spouse of the other, or (iii) instances of mutual actual loss of trust, love, and respect for each other. Distinctive of these and other instances is the harsh reality that spouses coerced together in a meaningless marital relationship would only physically or psychologically endanger either or both of them as they cannot both move on to more productive relationships but be forced to live in double or secret lives. x x x”
Estella therefore reinforced Tan-Andal and Georfo which makes clear that proof of psychological incapacity does not depend on clinical diagnoses or expert testimony. It may be established through competent ordinary evidence that illuminates the spouses’ lived marital realities. Testimonies from ordinary witnesses, the offended spouse, and members of the parties’ community may sufficiently demonstrate enduring patterns of behavior, character traits, and relational dynamics that reveal an utter inability to give meaning and substance to their marriage. Taken together, such evidence allows the courts to discern whether the failure of the marital relationship stems from a deeply rooted psychological incongruity and not from transient conflict, poor choices, or a simple unwillingness to make the marriage wok. (To be continued)