Bohol Tribune
Opinion

STARE DECISIS

BY ATTY. JULIUS GREGORY B. DELGADO 

IN RE: CITY OF KORONADAL, ET AL., G.R. NO. 265769 (AUGUST 12, 2025): RESTATEMENT OF THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE IN STRIKING DOWN THE MANNER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A CITY ORDINANCE SUPPOSEDLY IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER TO REGULATE TRAFFIC BY REQUIRING A BUS COMPANY TO USE THE CITY’S NEWLY CONSTRUCTED PUBLIC TERMINAL

The City of Koronadal enacted City Ordinance No. 9, Series of 2018, creating the City of Koronadal Integrated Transport Terminal Complex (CKITTC) to address traffic congestion and pollution, and to raise city revenues. Yellow Bus Lines (YBL), a duly franchised common carrier with its own LTFRB-accredited private terminal in Koronadal, was compelled by city authorities to reroute all its buses to the CKITTC and pay terminal fees for each entry.

YBL argued that the forced rerouting caused operational delays, vehicle damage due to poor diversion roads, and significant additional costs, and that the ordinance did not make CKITTC use mandatory.

The Regional Trial Court granted Yellow Bus Lines’ complaint for injunction, finding that the ordinance did not require all PUVs to use the CKITTC and that terminal fees applied only to those utilizing the terminal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, holding that the ordinance did not prohibit the use of private terminals nor make CKITTC use compulsory, and that the city’s actions were not a valid exercise of police power.

Before the Supreme Court, the City of Koronadal, on the one hand, argued that its ordinance is clear, mandatory, and applies to all PUVs, including YBL with no exceptions. Excluding YBL from the ordinance’s coverage would violate the equal protection clause and undermine the city’s regulatory authority. The City of Koronadal also argued that it has the power to regulate traffic and terminals. 

YBL, on the other hand, argued that the ordinance does not make CKITTC use mandatory as it only regulates those who actually use the terminal facilities. YBL also argued that there was not valid delegation of police power to the CTTRB to forcibly reroute YBL buses from their franchised route to the CKITTC. YBL also argued that notice to OSG was unnecessary since the validity of the ordinance itself was not being challenged, only its implementation against YBL. 

The Supreme Court restated the requisites for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that requiring all PUVs to utilize the CKITTC and abandon their private terminals cannot be considered as reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of alleviating traffic: “Similarly, in this case, requiring all PUVs to utilize the CKITTC and abandon their private terminals cannot be considered as reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of alleviating traffic congestion and ensuring safety and order in the city’s business center. On the contrary, this kind of measure is overbroad and disproportionate to the end sought to be accomplished. To stress, it was not shown that compelling PUVs to use the CKITTC is the only solution to the problem of traffic or safety concerns. In fact, petitioners did not allege, much less prove, that the city had explored and implemented other measures to solve the issue. As we have emphasized in Lucena and MMDA, there are other less invasive measures that can be resorted to mitigate, if not eliminate, the chronic traffic problem.”

The Supreme Court also held that the ordinance did not require the use of CKITTC as mandatory for all PUVs operating within the City of Koronadal: “As worded, Section 4 of the Ordinance speaks of its scope, and lists down the relevant actors and/or stakeholders in the operation of a public utility terminal, including PUVs, lease holders, contractors, and entities occupying specified spaces or stalls, and the passengers/commuters. However, there is nothing in that section that categorically requires all PUVs to utilize the CKITTC or prevents the use of existing private terminals. Meanwhile, Section 11 only mandates that all PUVs utilizing the services of the terminal facilities pay the corresponding fees, but does not require all PUVs operating within the city to avail such terminal services. Finally, Section 19, in relation to Section 24, imposes a penalty for loading and unloading in non-specified areas, but these non-specified areas are not defined in the Ordinance. The non-specified areas could very well refer to areas inside the CKITTC that are not designated for loading and unloading, and do not immediately mean areas or terminals other than the CKITTC.”

As such, the way the said ordinance was implemented violated the property rights of YBL: “If only to emphasize, preventing respondent from using its private terminals and charging it for the use of the CKITTC are outright oppressive and confiscatory. It is a violation of respondent’s property rights, which cannot be allowed under the guise of performing the local government unit’s duty to its inhabitants under the general welfare clause. It bears stressing that due deference to the rights of the individual requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.”

The ruling restates that an LGU may regulate traffic and establish or supervise public terminals under its police and revenue powers, but the regulation must be reasonable, non-oppressive, and authorized by the ordinance’s text. An LGU may impose terminal fees on vehicles that voluntarily use or avail themselves of the terminal’s services, but it cannot forcibly reroute public utility vehicles or compel them to use the public terminal—and thereby pay fees—when the ordinance does not clearly impose mandatory terminal use. Thus, the power to regulate traffic and the power to raise revenue do not authorize an arbitrary invasion of private property or the use of revenue collection as a basis for compulsory terminalization.

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