CARTOON BY: AARON PAUL C. CARIL
EDITORIAL
Mandates, not extensions
Republic Act No. 12326 calls itself a law “fixing the term of office” of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials at five years. It also sets the next regular elections for the second Monday of November 2028. The phrase is legally precise, but its practical effect is plain: voters who expected to pass judgment in 2026 must wait two more years, while incumbents remain in power without a renewed mandate.
Congress has constitutional authority to determine the length of barangay terms. Yet authority is not a blank cheque. Changing the term after officials have already been elected risks turning a general rule for future officeholders into an immediate benefit for those presently occupying office. A legislature should prescribe the rules before the contest, not enlarge the prize after the winners have taken their seats.
The prevailing Supreme Court ruling on Republic Act No. 12232 must be stated fairly. The Court upheld that measure as a term-setting law, not an election-postponement law, because the Constitution gives Congress sole authority to define barangay officials’ terms and, by necessary implication, when those terms begin. It also found that elections remained regular, periodic and certain under a fixed four-year cycle. Unless reversed or distinguished, that is the controlling doctrine—not the outcome critics may prefer.
But that ruling should not become a drafting formula for avoiding constitutional scrutiny. The earlier Macalintal decision struck down Republic Act No. 11935 and warned that postponing elections burdens the fundamental right of suffrage unless supported by sufficiently important, substantial or compelling reasons. Calling a delay “term-fixing” cannot by itself settle whether a new statute genuinely establishes a durable electoral cycle or merely confers an extended tenure on sitting officials.
That concern is sharper here. Republic Act No. 12326 lengthens the term to five years, moves the 2026 polls to 2028, and treats incumbents as having completed one term because of a two-year extension. The law thus acknowledges the very benefit at issue. Continuity and training may improve local administration, but neither substitutes for the electorate’s scheduled opportunity to reward, reject or replace its officials.
The Supreme Court should apply its prevailing doctrine without surrendering its duty to examine substance over label. Congress may fix prospective terms; it should not manufacture fresh mandates for incumbents. If five years is sound policy, let it govern officials elected under that rule. Democratic legitimacy is renewed at the ballot box, not prolonged by legislative wording.