BY ATTY. JULIUS GREGORY B. DELGADO
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, G.R. NO. 188066 (OCTOBER 22, 2014): ACTS MUST BE ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY OR OPPRESSION
Respondent Cynthia E. Caberoy (Caberoy) is the principal of Ramon Avanceňa National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and violation of Section 3 (e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. For her defense, Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging, among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to 15, 2002 and June 16 to 30, 2002 show that Tuares received her salary as shown by her signatures on these payrolls.
The Ombudsman found Caberoy guilty of Oppression and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. The Ombudsman held that Tuares was singled out as there were other teachers who were not able to submit their clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST) yet received their salaries for the same month. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the Ombudsman and held that the acts of Caberoy do not constitute Oppression.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and held that even assuming that Tuares received her June 2002 salary only on July 2002, the same does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as an “act of cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority,” especially when she contributed to the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002.
The Court restated what the offense of Oppression is which is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.
The Court also held that just like other grave offenses, bad faith must attend to the act complained to hold Caberoy liable for Oppression. The Court held: “It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. There must be evidence, independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out Tuares. The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge. ‘Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on.’ Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of issuance of the vouchers and the checks as shown in the payroll, the records of this case are bereft of evidence that will support its view that the delay in the release of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was singled out. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, ‘[t]he certifications issued by Acting Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares] who was not included in the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not included because they failed to submit the required year-end clearance. x x x Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out or discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman.’”