By Atty. Julius Gregory B. Delgado

PEOPLE VS. ROMMEL JIMENEZ, G.R. NO. 263278 (OCTOBER 11, 2023): PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED NOT DEMOLISHED BY AN IDENTIFICATION THAT IS FULL OF UNCERTAINTIES

Accused Rommel Jimenez was accused of Murder of a certain Jiamiao Shi a.k.a. Sandy Sy on or about March 21, 2016, at 3:00 o’ clock in the afternoon in Brgy. Pilaway, Municipality of Infanta, Province of Quezon. The prosecution presented Norli Ducog (Norli) and Lowell Oblifias (Lowell) as witnesses. Norli testified that he was having a break from work and was standing at the national road when he saw a vehicle made a halt to give way to an approaching van. According to Norli, a motorcycle stopped beside the said vehicle and the “backrider” suddenly alighted and shot the driver who was later identified as victim Jiamiao Sy or Sandy Sy. Norli described the motorcycle driver as tall and slim, and with dark skin and dimpled cheeks. He also reported that the “backrider” was tall and fat, with a mole on his face. Norli asserted that his eyes crossed paths with the “backrider” who later fled. Norli also testified that Infanta Police Station invited him for questioning and produced a “rouge gallery” with pictures of their detainees wherein Norli positively identified accused Jimenez as the “backrider” who shot and killed Sandy. Norli finally testified that he was four meters away from the vehicle and five to six meters from the accused Jimenez. Lowell testified that he was the helper of Sandy, and he accompanied the latter in doing errands in the morning of March 21, 2016. Lowell testified that he saw the lifeless body of the victim inside the vehicle but explained that he did not personally see the shooting incident.  Accused Jimenez’s defense is alibi asserting that he travelled from Los Baňos, Laguna in the morning and arrived Recto, Manila between 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. and only returned to Laguna around 3:00 p.m., hence, making it impossible to be in Infanta, Quezon at the approximate time the crime happened. The trial court convicted accused Jimenez of Murder which conviction was sustained by the Court of Appeals. 

The Supreme Court restated the doctrine that for accused Jimenez’s judgement of conviction to be sustained, the following must be considered: first, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the prosecution’s compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the elements of the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be present. In the instant case, the Court held that while the prosecution was able to establish that all the elements of the crime of Murder are present, the Court cannot affirm the trial court’s finding of guilt when the identity of the perpetrator is doubtful. 

Citing the celebrated case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos 111206-08 (October 6, 1995), the Supreme Court applied the totality of circumstances test in determining the reliability, or at times even the admissibility,  of a witness’ out-of-court identification of the accused. The Court held that it requires factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identification: one, the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; two, the witness’ degree of attention at that time; three, the accuracy of any prior description given the witness; four, the length of time the crime and the identification; five, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and six, the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 

The Supreme Court also laid down the so-called danger signals caution that the identification may be erroneous even though the method used is proper, to wit: (1) the witness originally stated that he or she could not identify anyone; (2) the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation against him or her when questioned by the police; (3) a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness’ original description and the actual description of the accused; (4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness identified some other person; (5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused; (6) before the trial, witness sees the accused but fails to identify him or her; (7) before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to see the accused; (8) the witness and the person identified are at different racial groups; (9) during his or her original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness was unaware that a crime was involved; (10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness’ view of the criminal and his identification of the accused; (11) several persons committed the crime; and (12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.

Applying the doctrines restated, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the conviction and acquitted accused Jimenez. The Court held that the identification was done through a show-up and applying the totality of circumstances test, the out-of-court identification made by Norli was unreliable and could not be made the basis for accused Jimenez’s conviction. The Court also held that a comprehensive analysis of Norli’s testimony reveals that such is dubious and lacks probative weight, to wit: 

“Norli’s opportunity to view the criminals and degree of focus at the time are suspect. To begin with, the assailant was wearing a white cap. Given the considerable distance of Norli from the assailant and the fact that the latter was wearing a cap, it cannot be gainsaid that Norli lacked the opportunity to positively identify the assailant since it would be more difficult to see someone’s face especially if covered. The degree of Norli’s focus and opportunity to view the assailant might have been impaired since there were allegedly two suspects in the killing, i.e., the gunman and the motorcycle driver. It also seems suspect that from 5 to 6 meters away, Norli can see and identify a mole on the assailant’s face. In this regard, Norli notably testified that the barracks where he was working at during the incident was 15 meters away from the vehicle where the victim was killed.  Hence, the possibility of mistake in the identification of the accused-appellant could not be discounted.

So too, while the length of time between the identification of accused-appellant and the crime is relatively short, there are significant concerns as to the suggestibility of the witnesses during the show up. To underline, the crime happened on 21 March 2016, while the identification transpired on 2 May 2016. Thus, the identification occurred one month and two weeks after the incident.

It is also worthy to note from Norli’s testimony that he used the word ‘namukhaan’ instead: of ‘nakilala’ thus showing an unconvincing level of certainty in his identification of accused-appellant. In his initial testimony before the police, he merely recounted that the assailant was ‘matabang lalaki, malaki ang tiyan, mataas’. Significantly, when asked in court, Norli also said that the assailant was wearing a white t-shirt, but this detail was not mentioned in any of his affidavits. Finally, the police officer who presented the rouges gallery to Norli failed to testify on how the presentation transpired. Neither did Norli recount how the photos were presented to him. There could have been improper suggestion by the change of the officer’s tone or by staring a bit longer on the photo of accused-appellant. It was also revealed from the records that accused-appellant’s photo was presented to Norli a month after the incident took place, and while Norli was detained in the police station for investigation. The person of accused-appellant was also shown to Norli when the former was inside the jail. It is likewise unclear how many photos and suspects were shown to Norli for identification. Remarkably, no explanation was offered as to why accused-appellant’s photo was shown as one of the suspects.

Hence, it is highly probable that Norli was testifying not based on his own personal knowledge but on the suggestiveness of the circumstance.”

The Supreme Court concluded that due to (1) the unusual situation that Norli just witnessed, (2) the brief period he allegedly saw the assailant’s face, and 3) his position relative to where the assailant was, make it difficult to believe that Norli was able to accurately identify the assailant. The Court held that the interim period of one month from the time of the incident and the time Norli gave his sworn statement to the authorities and identified accused Jimenez from the show-up could have affected Norli’s ability to recall the assailant’s identity. The Court also observe that Norli admitted that he has never met nor seen the assailant prior to the incident which compels the Court to doubt the accuracy of Norli’s recollection.